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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT W. BARNES, JR., DAVID C. 
BARNES, SUSAN B. NIELSON, dba 
THE BARNES FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
vs. 
RICHARD C. WOOD and MARILYN P. 
WOOD, dba FERNWOOD CANDY & 
ICE CREAM COMPANY, a 
partnership, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review on this 
Appeal: 
1. Was there substantial evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that the modification agreement entered into 
by the parties reducing the rent under the Lease did not 
abrogate the escalation clause contained in paragraph 3 of the 
Lease, and that the reduced rental amount remained subject to 
future escalations? 
2. Was there substantial evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that the mere fact that the lessee paid for a 
period of time less than the full amount of rent which the 
lessee was obligated to pay did not bar the lessor from 
recovering the full amount of rent owed? 
RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 20424 
3. Was there substantial evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that the lessee agreed to and acquiesced in 
the use by the lessor of the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban 
Consumers" to calculate escalations in rent and that such 
index reasonably comported with the intention of the parties 
when they entered into the Lease? 
4. Was there substantial evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that the lessee is liable for arrearages in 
property tax payments when the Lease provided that such 
payments would be due from the lessee "upon proof of payment 
of the same" where the lessee never requested proof of 
payment, never objected to paying on the basis that proof of 
payment had not been received, and where the lessor proved at 
trial that the taxes had been paid? 
5. Was there substantial evidence to support the trial 
court's award of attorneys' fees based upon the evidence 
presented by the lessor's counsel as to the amount of fees 
charged, the nature of the services performed and the time 
spent, and where the parties stipulated that attorneys' fees 
could be determined upon affidavits? 
II. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by Respondents Robert W. 
Barnes, Jr., David C. Barnes and Susan B. Nielson, doing 
business as The Barnes Family Partnership (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Barnes Children"), to recover arrearages 
in rent owed by Appellants Richard C. Wood and Marilyn P. 
Wood, doing business as Fernwood Candy & Jce Cream Co. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Wood"), pursuant to a Lease 
Agreement dated September 1, 1976 between Jacqueline Barnes 
(hereinafter referred to as "Mrs. Barnes"), the mother of the 
Barnes Children, and Wood. Wood counterclaimed for attorneys1 
fees on the basis that the filing of the action constituted a 
breach of the Lease Agreement. 
III. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The case was tried to the Court on August 14, 15 and 
16, 1984. The trial court thereafter entered Judgment in 
favor of the Barnes Children for the back rent claimed to be 
owed, for the increase in property taxes owed and for costs 
and attorneys1 fees. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACtS 
A. Facts. 
On or about September 1, 1976, Mrs. Barnes leased 
certain property located at 3364 South 2300 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, commonly known as the Palace Ice Cream Store, to 
Wood for a period of ten years commencing September 1, 1976. 
Pursuant to the paragraph 3 of the Lease, the initial 
monthly rent was $750.00. However, the parties also agreed to 
the following escalation provision: 
"[T]he monthly rental shall be adjusted upward 
or downward based upon the United States Cost of 
Living Index, using August 1976 as a base, provided 
that the index must rise or fall 5% from the base 
or prior adjusted level before adjustments in the 
rent are made." [Ex. 1] 
Paragraph 4 of the Lease required Wood to pay 75% of 
any increase in property taxes in excess of 5% of the 1976 
taxes. [Ex. 1] 
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 10 of the 
Lease, Mrs. Barnes subleased to Wood her leasehold interest in 
a parking lot adjacent to the leased premises. Wood agreed to 
pay 75% of the parking lot rental. Paragraph 3 of the parking 
lot lease contained the same rental escalation provision that 
was contained in the premises lease based upon "the United 
States Government Cost of Living Index." [Ex. 3] 
The provisions of the Lease requiring Wood to pay 75% 
of the increase in property taxes and 75% of the parking lot 
rental were based upon the fact that Wood was using 75% of the 
property. [R. 340, 343 & 514] 
On or about September 6, 1979, Raymond A. Hintze 
("Hintze"), attorney for Mrs. Barnes, sent a letter to Wood 
notifying Wood that pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, the 
base rent of $750.00 per month was being increased effective 
September 1, 1979 to $960.00 per month based upon cost of 
living figures obtained from the United States Government. 
Hintze also informed Wood that the parking lot lease had 
increased to $200.00 per month and, mistakenly, that Woodfs 
share of the lease payment on the parking lot would thereafter 
be $100.00, for a total rental payment of $1,060.00 per 
month. Wood knew that the Lease obligated Wood to pay 75% of 
the parking lot lease or $150 and that it looked like Hintze 
made an error, but did not inform Hintze bf the error. [R. 
516] In his letter, Hintze also notified Wood that $118.81 
was due under the Lease for Wood's 75% share of the increased 
property taxes. [Ex. 7] The index used by Hintze to determine 
escalations in the rent based upon increases in the cost of 
living was the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers 
("CPI-U"), prepared by the Bureau of Laboif Statistics, United 
States Department of Labor. [R. 508; Ex. tl] 
Neither Wood nor Wood's attorney objected that the 
escalations requested by Hintze had not b^en properly 
determined under the Lease or that the index utilized by 
Hintze to determine those escalations was improper. [R. 514, 
550] In this regard, at the time the Lease was executed, Wood 
assumed that the escalation clause would be governed by a cost 
of living index covering all items and applicable to the 
United States as a whole and not by some sub-index, such as an 
index for a region of the United States. Wood didn't even 
know sub-indexes existed. [R. 520 & 522] In fact, in 
September 1979, Wood began paying the increased rent of $1,060 
per month as demanded by Hintze. [R. 586] 
Although Wood began paying the increased rent, on or 
about December 5, 1979, Gaylen S. Young, Jr. ("Young"), 
attorney for Wood, sent a letter to Hintze seeking to 
negotiate a reduction in the rent. [Ex. 8] Young claimed in 
that letter that it was impossible for Wood to continue on 
with the Lease unless the rent was renegotiated and that Wood 
was "losing several thousand dollars a year" on the Palace 
store. Shortly after the Young letter was sent, Wood called 
Hintze and told him the escalations may force Wood into 
bankruptcy. [R. 356] In fact, these claims were false. Wood 
was not losing "several" thousand dollars a year on the store 
and the small losses actually realized were artificially 
caused by the fact that Wood substantially marked-up the price 
of ice cream which he sold to himself and arbitrarily 
allocated to the store substantial overhead expenses incurred 
by the manufacturing arm of Wood's business. [R. 575-576, 642, 
658, 661] In any event, Young proposed in his letter the 
following reduction in rent: 
"Fernwoods would like to work out some fair 
negotiation in regard to this Lease with your 
client that would be fair. Perhaps a $900 per 
month base could be suggested, plus all increases 
in property taxes over the 1979 base." [Emphasis 
added] [Ex. 8] 
Young testified at trial that he didn't know why he used the 
word "base" in his December 5, 1979 letter but that he 
understood the term "base" to mean whatever Richard Wood 
understood that term to mean. [R. 554-556] Wood understood 
the term "base" rent to mean the rent from which escalations 
are calculated. [R. 615, 616] That is the normal usage of the 
term "base" with respect to leases and is what Hintze 
understood Young's use of the term "base" to mean. [R. 
357-359, 389-390] 
While discussions between the parties on a reduction in 
rent were pending, and in January 1980, Mrs. Barnes was 
murdered by a burglar who had broken into her home. Ferris 
Collett was appointed Personal Representative of her Estate 
and Hintze acted as attorney for the Estate. [R. 347, 392] 
Shortly after Mrs. Barnes1 death and on or about 
January 23, 1980, Hintze sent a letter to Young agreeing to 
reduce the rent to $1,000 per month ($900.00 base rent for the 
building and $100.00 for the parking lot). [Ex. 9] Hintze 
only intended this to be a reduction of the base rent from 
which future excalations would be calculated and there was 
never any discussion or agreement between the parties that the 
escalation clause of the Lease would be eliminated or that 
there would be no future escalations in the rent. [R. 364, 
371, 388, 390, 392, 558 & 563] In fact, Young understood that 
Wood would remain responsible for future increases in property 
taxes. [R. 567] 
Although Wood never formally accepted the offer 
contained in Hintze's January 23, 1980 to reduce the rent, 
Wood did start paying $1,000 per month rent in February 1980 
and continued making that payment. [R. 397, 598] 
In the Summer of 1979, prior to Hintze's September 6, 
1979 letter demanding an increase in rent, the parking lot 
lease had expired and in September 1979, Mrs. Barnes 
negotiated a new lease agreement on the parking lot. [R. 344] 
On February 14, 1980, under the guise that (Wood had only 
recently been informed of the expiration of the parking lot 
lease, Wood attempted to obtain a further reduction in the 
rent by claiming that the expiration of the original parking 
lot lease constituted a default by Mrs. Barnes under the lease 
agreement. [Exs. 10 & 12; R. 599] In fact, Wood knew all 
about the expiration of the parking lot lease and the 
execution of the new parking lot lease back in the Fall of 
1979 when the rental reduction to $1,000 a month was being 
negotiated. [-R. 586-87, 611-613] Hintze refused Wood's 
transparent attempt to renegotiate a 'better deal. [Exs. 11 & 
13] 
Mrs. Barnes1 Will gave the Palace Ice Cream Store 
property to her children, and in January 1981, the Barnes 
Children received a Personal Representative's Deed to the 
property from Ferris Collett. [R. 347-348, 421-22] Prior to 
the Summer of 1982, the Barnes Children did not read the Lease 
and had no knowledge of the provisions of the Lease providing 
for escalations in the base rent based upon increases in the 
cost of living index. [R. 406, 422, 422A] The Barnes Children 
had no reason to read the Lease prior to the Summer of 1982 
because they did not know there was a problem with the Lease. 
[R. 426] 
In the Summer of 1982, the Barnes Children learned for 
the first time from their father, Warren Barnes, that there 
was an apparent shortfall in the rent that was being paid 
under the Lease. [R. 406, 422] Accordingly, on or about 
October 12, 1982, the Barnes Children sent a letter to Wood 
demanding the back rental payments and property tax payments 
due pursuant to the provisions of the Lea£e. [Ex, 14] Wood 
rejected the demand for back rental payments and property tax 
payments and refused to increase the monthly rental payments 
above $1,000 per month. Wood did not refuse to make the back 
rental payments on the basis that the wrong escalation index 
had been used nor did Wood request proof of payment of the 
property taxes or refuse to pay property taxes on the basis 
that no proof of payment had been provided. [R. 619] The 
Barnes Children then commenced this action seeking to recover 
the back rental payments and property tax^s due. 
B. The Proceedings Below. 
The Barnes Children sought recoveryf below for the back 
payments due under the Lease and for Wood's fraud in 
misrepresenting the financial condition of his business in 
order to obtain the rent reduction back in 1980. [R. 134-148] 
Wood filed a Counterclaim seeking attorneys' fees on the basis 
that the Barnes Children had breached the modified Lease by 
commencing this action. [R. 15-20] The case went to trial 
before the Court on August 14, 15 and 16, 1984. Thereafter, 
and on or about August 30, 1984, the Court entered a Minute 
At the time this letter was sent, thfe Barnes Children 
had no knowledge of the rent reduction agreement 
between Hintze and Wood and did not fearn of that 
agreement until after the filing of this lawsuit. [R. 
401, 406, 422, 426 & 427] The Barne$ Children further 
did not have any knowledge of the parking lot rent 
splitting arrangement prior to the filing of this 
lawsuit. [R. 420, 422A; Ex. 14] 
Order ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on all claims except the 
fraud claim. [R. 227] 
Paragraph 14 of the Lease Agreement provided that in 
the event of default under the Lease, the defaulting party 
would pay all costs and expenses, including reasonable 
attorneys1 fees incurred in enforcing the Lease. The parties 
stipulated below that the prevailing party could prove its 
attorneys1 fees by affidavit. Counsel for the Barnes Children 
presented evidence by affidavit as to the nature of the 
services performed and number of hours spent on the case, that 
the total attorneys1 fees incurred in this action were $9,850, 
that those fees were billed at a rate approximately 20% below 
counsel1s then current billing rate and that virtually no 
additional time, effort or expense was incurred in presenting 
the fraud claim (with respect to which attorneys' fees were 
not recoverable) because the same witnesses, documents, 
testimony and arguments would have been presented with or 
without the fraud claim. [R. 256-257, 277-283] 
Wood objected to the amount of attorneys1 fees and 
costs claimed by the Barnes Children. [R. 270] After a 
hearing in October 1984, the Court ruled that the unsuccessful 
prosecution of the fraud claim reasonably involved one-third 
of the attorneys1 fees claimed by the Barnes Children and 
therefore reduced the attorneys1 fees claimed by one-third. 
[R. 285] Thereafter, on November 6, 1984, Judgment was entered 
in favor of the Barnes Children in the following amounts: 
$13,072.77 for back rental on the premises Lease; $4,718.82 
for back rental on the parking lot lease; $1,081.05 for 
property taxes; attorneys1 fees of $6,566.66; and costs of 
$476.34. [R. 286-288] 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court correctly determined that the 
modification agreement entered into by the parties in January 
1980, did not abrogate the escalation provisions of the Lease 
and that the reduced rent provided for by the modification 
agreement remained subject to future escalations because of 
cost of living increases. In the negotiations between the 
parties, it is clear that the only matter ever discussed was a 
reduction in the "base" rent from which future escalations 
would be calculated and that there was never any discussion 
whatsoever between the parties that the escalation clause 
would not remain in effect or that there would be a fixed 
rental amount for the remainder of the lease term. Any 
agreement to modify the Lease would have had to be in writing 
under the Statute of Frauds. 
2. The fact that the Barnes Children received 
$1,000.00 a month from Wood, constituting only a portion of 
the full rent due, until the Fall of 1982, did not bar the 
Barnes Children, as a matter of law, from collecting 
arrearages in rent. The issues of whether the Barnes Children 
were barred by waiver or estoppel from collecting the full 
amount of rent due were questions of fact for the trial court 
to resolve. The trial court resolved these issues in favor of 
the Barnes Children based upon substantial evidence. The 
Barnes Children did not intentionally and knowingly give up 
their right to collect the full amount of rent due. Wood was 
not damaged by any delay by the Barnes Children in attempting 
to collect the arrearages in rent. 
3. The trial court properly determined based upon 
substantial evidence that the Barnes Children were entitled to 
recover escalations in the rent based upon the CPI-U index 
because Wood agreed and acquiesced in the use of that index 
and that index fairly comported with the intention of the 
parties in entering into the Lease. Wood gave up any right to 
complain about the use of this index when back in 1980 he 
entered into the modification agreement for a reduction of 
rent in settlement of a dispute between the parties after Mrs. 
Barnes had already demanded an increase in rent based upon 
that index. 
4. The trial court correctly determined based upon 
substantial evidence that the Barnes Children were not barred 
from recovering the increases in property taxes simply because 
prior to trial they had not presented proof to Wood of payment 
of the taxes. Wood never requested proof of payment of the 
taxes and never refused to pay his share of the taxes on the 
basis that proof had not been given to him. Rather, Wood 
always refused to pay the taxes based upon his contention that 
he was only obligated to pay a fixed rent for the remainder of 
the term. The Barnes Children undeniably proved at trial that 
they had paid the taxes so that in any event Wood was 
obligated to pay the taxes at that time. 
5. The trial court's award of attorneys1 fees to the 
Barnes Children was proper. Counsel for the Barnes Children 
presented evidence as to the total fees incurred, the nature 
of the services performed and the total number of hours 
involved. Counsel also presented evidence that no additional 
time was spent in pursuing the unsuccessful fraud claim for 
which attorneys1 fees could not be recovered. The fact that 
the trial court disagreed with counsel's testimony that no 
additional time was spent in connection with the fraud claim 
and reduced the attorneys' fees sought by one-third based upon 
the trial court's own review of the evidence and knowledge of 
the case does not make the trial court's decision erroneous. 
The trial court was not limited to totally adopting or totally 
rejecting the evidence presented by the Barnes Children on 
attorneys' fees. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
MODIFICATION TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT DID NOT 
ABROGATE THE ESCALATION PROVISION. 
Wood argues that the trial court erred in determining 
that the modification agreement entered into by the parties in 
January 1980 did not abrogate the escalation provision of the 
Lease, and that, as a matter of law, the trial court could 
only have found that the parties agreed that the rent would be 
fixed at $1,000.00 for the remainder of the Lease term. This 
argument is clearly without merit as there was more than 
substantial evidence to support the trial court's 
determination. 
In this regard, the trial court made the factual 
determination that: 
"No agreement was requested or made concerning 
the escalation provisions of the lease and the 
$900.00 amount remains subject to the escalation 
provisions of the lease." [Amended Findings of Fact 
No. 16, R. 292] 
Wood simply seeks to overturn this factual determination by 
focusing on his version of the facts and largely ignoring the 
evidence supporting the trial court's decision. 
When Hintze notified Wood of the rent increase by 
letter dated September 6, 1979, Hintze specifically stated 
that applying the cost of living increases that had occurred, 
"the base rent for the Palace, effective September 1, 1979, is 
$960.00." [emphasis added] [Ex. 7]. In reply to that letter, 
Young sent a letter to Hintze dated December 5, 1979 [Ex. 8]. 
In that letter, Young did not request, or make any mention of, 
a fixed rental rate for the remainder of the term of the 
Lease. Rather, Young stated that "[p]erhaps a $900.00 per 
month base could be suggested. . . ." [Emphasis added] Thus, 
there is no doubt that in the negotiations the parties were 
negotiating what the "base" rent would be, not a fixed rent 
for the remainder of the lease term. Wood understood the term 
"base" rent meant the rent from which future escalations are 
calculated. 
Wood tries to take Hintze's January 23, 1980 letter, in 
which he offers to reduce the rent to $1,000.00 per month 
(including the parking), out of context by arguing that the 
letter does not specify that the $1,000.00 per month rent 
would only apply for one year rather than for the remainder of 
the term. It is true that Hintze's letter did not indicate, 
one way or the other, the period for which the $1,000 amount 
would apply. Taken in context, however, it is clear, as found 
by the trial court, that the $1,000.00 per month offer simply 
represented a compromise between the initial demand made by 
Mrs. Barnes for a base rent of $960.00 plus $100.00 for the 
parking, for a total rental of $1,060.00, and the 
counter-offer made by Young of a $900.00 base rent. The 
evidence was overwhelming that there was never any discussion 
whatsoever between the parties that the escalation clause of 
the Lease would be abrogated, or that there would be a fixed 
rental for the remainder of term. Furthermore, any agreement 
to modify the Lease by deleting the escalation provision would 
have had to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds. Utah 
Code Ann., Section 25-5-3; Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 
P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975). No such writing ever existed. 
In short, the determination of what the terms of the 
modification agreement between the parties were was a question 
of fact for the trial court to resolve. Wood is now simply 
rearguing the evidence which the trial court rejected. Wood 
is precluded from doing so. 
B. THE ACCEPTANCE OF RENT DID NOT BAR THE PARTNERSHIP 
FROM COLLECTING ARREARAGES IN RENT. 
Wood's argument that the Barnes Children's action for 
arrearages in rent is barred under the doctrines of equitable 
estoppel and waiver is without merit. 
Wood is again simply trying to overturn factual 
determinations made by the trial court. The trial court 
specifically found that Wood agreed that the reduction in rent 
to $1,000.00 per month was for a period of one year only,- that 
the escalation provision of the Lease remained binding upon 
Wood and that the Barnes Children had not waived their right 
to collect the rent. It is well settled that both equitable 
estoppel and waiver are issues for the trier of fact. Mehl v. 
People Ex Rel. Dept. of Public Works, 532 P.2d 489 (Cal. 
1975); Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal.Rptr. 42 (1979); Chavez v. 
Gomez, 423 P.2d 31 (N.M. 1967). The trial court heard and 
considered the evidence presented by Wood in support of the 
estoppel and waiver claims and chose to believe the Barnes 
Childrens' evidence. The trial court's determination is fully 
supported by the evidence. 
Numerous cases have recognized that the mere acceptance 
by a landlord of less than the full amount of rent owed by a 
tenant does not bar the landlord from bringing an action for 
arrearages in rent. See, e.g., Green v. Millman Brothers, 
Inc., 151 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. 1967); Tower v. Moskowitz, 262 
S.2d 276 (Fla. 1972); Steinman v. La Charty Hotel Co., 50 A.2d 
297 (Pa. 1947); Corthouts v. Connecticut Fire Safety Services 
Corp., 193 A.2d 909 (Conn. 1963); Cottage Associates v. The 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, 387 N.Y.S.2d 18 
(1976); Walker v. Associated Dry Goods Corporation, 189 A.2d 
91 (Md. 1963). 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. Panorama Res. Protective Ass'n. v^  Panorama Corp., 627 
P.2d 121 (Wash. 1981); Bowman v. Webster, 269 P.2d 960 (Wash. 
1954); Chavez v. Gomez, supra. The evidence was more than 
sufficient to support the trial court's determination that a 
waiver had not occurred. The Barnes Children had no knowledge 
of the escalation clause in the contract, or that the full 
amount of rent called for by the contract was not being paid 
until the summer of 1982, at which time, they acted promptly 
and diligently in making demand for the full rental payments. 
It is certainly understandable that the Barnes Children would 
not gain knowledge of these facts until the Summer of 1982, in 
view of the tragic murder of their mother in 1981 and the 
circumstances under which the Lease was conveyed to them. 
Nor did Wood present any evidence sufficient to give 
rise to estoppel. In this regard, Wood totally failed to 
present any evidence that the failure of the Barnes Children 
to insist upon the full amount of rent until 1982 caused Wood 
any damage. Wood's only claim of damage is that if the Barnes 
Children are not estopped, Wood will be damaged by having to 
pay the back rent and taxes. Those sums dq not constitute 
damage to Wood as they are precisely the amounts which the 
trial court found Wood had agreed to pay under the Lease. In 
this regard, Wood presented absolutely no evidence that during 
the period of time Wood supposedly remained in possession of 
the premises in reliance upon the claimed reduced rental 
agreement that Wood's business lost money rather than enjoying 
a profit. The trial court expressly found that Wood was not 
prejudiced by any delay by the Barnes Children in demanding 
payment of the back rent and taxes. [R. 292, Finding of Fact 
No. 20] 
The only cases cited by Wood in support of Wood's 
estoppel argument which involved a landlord-tenant situation 
are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In all 
those cases, (Wood's Brief, pages 35-36), the trial court had 
found that an oral agreement reducing the rent had, in fact, 
been entered into, and simply held that under the particular 
circumstances there present, the landlord was bound by the 
oral rent reduction agreement. In the present case, the trial 
court found that there was rio rent reduction agreement, except 
for the one year period. 
In summary, the issues of waiver and estoppel clearly 
presented issues of fact for the trial court to resolve. The 
trial court, based upon substantial evidence, determined these 
factual issues adversely to Wood, and there is no basis for 
challenging the trial court's determination. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE PROVISIONS 
OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE LEASE. 
Wood's argument that the trial court erred in ruling 
that the Barnes Children are entitled to escalations in the 
rent based upon the CPI-U when the Lease provided that 
escalations would be based upon the "United States Cost of 
Living Index" is erroneous. 
In the first place/ it is uncontested that in the Fall 
of 1979 when Mrs. Barnes increased the rent based upon the 
increase in the CPI-U that a dispute arose between the parties 
as to whether Wood had to pay the increased rent. Wood 
actually threatened to file a lawsuit to obtain a 
determination that he didn't have to pay the increased rent 
demanded by Mrs. Barnes. [Ex. 8] The dispute was settled by 
the parties' entering into a modification agreement in January 
1980 whereby the amount of the rent was reduced subject to 
future escalations. Wood is bound by that settlement which 
the trial court found obligated him to pay future escalations 
and Wood cannot now for the first time object that the wrong 
index was used by Mrs. Barnes in calculating the rent increase 
in 1979. 
Second, Wood acquiesced in the escalation calculations 
made by Hintze based upon the CPI-U and actually paid the 
increased rent calculated pursuant to that index from 
September 1979 through January 1980 when the modification 
agreement was entered into by the parties. Furthermore, the 
separate parking lot lease also provided for escalations based 
upon the "United States Government Cost of Living Index". 
Wood paid the escalations calculated under that Lease without 
objection. In Johnston v. First National Bank and Trust Co. 
624 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1981), a case cited by Wood, the Court 
held that although the escalation clause in the contract was 
too indefinite to be enforced, nevertheless, the one plaintiff 
who paid the rent increases demanded by the landlord could not 
complain that the escalation clause in the contract was too 
indefinite to be enforced. 
Finally, contrary to Wood's assertion, the relevant 
language of paragraph 3 of the Lease contained a latent 
ambiguity as to whether the parties were referring to an index 
entitled specifically "United States Cost of Living Index" or 
simply to an index covering the United States as a whole and 
not excluding any items because no index entitled "United 
States Cost of Living Index" existed. Extrinsic evidence is 
always admissible to interpret a latent ambiquity and the 
intent and meaning of the parties is a question of fact for 
the trier of fact. Ford v. Ward, 130 So.2d 380 (Ala. 1961); 
Hamada v. Valley Nat'l. Bank, 555 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. 1976); 
McCarty v. Mercury Metalcraft Co., 127 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1964) 
cert, denied, 380 U.S. 952 (1965); Koplin v. Franklin Ins. Co. 
of Philadelphia, 44 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1945); Barco Urban Renewal 
Corp. v. Housing Auth., 674 F.2d 1001 (3rd Cir. 1982). The 
trial court simply interpreted this ambiguous provision and 
determined that the CPI-U index which covered the whole United 
States clearly comported with the intent and meaning of the 
parties. [R. 290-291, Finding of Fact No. 7] The evidence 
fully supported this finding. 
Wood testified that he assumed at the time he signed 
the Lease that an index existed covering the entire United 
States and not excluding any items or covering any sub regions 
[R. 522]. The CPI-U comports in all respects with the index 
Wood thought was described in the Agreement and intended would 
apply* [R. 290, Finding of Fact No. 2] The fact that the 
Lease did not recite the precise name of the index and 
contained the language "Cost of Living Index" instead 
"Consumer Price Index" is not determinative. See, Panorama 
Residential Protective Association v. Panorama Corporation, 
supra. 
The cases cited by Wood which held that the references 
to indexes in escalation clauses of leases were too indefinite 
to enforce (Wood's Brief, pages 42 and 44) are distinguishable 
from the case at bar. 
In Seattle First National Bank v. Earl, 565 P.2d 1215 
(Wash. 1977), the escalation clause provided that the lease 
payments would be increased based upon the "Cost of Living 
figures for the City of Spokane". There simply were no cost 
of living figures for Spokane. In the present case, there 
are, in fact, cost of living figures for the entire United 
States, which are the figures utilized by Mrs. Barnes and 
later the Barnes Children to calculate the rent increases. 
Further, the terminology utilized in the lease in the Seattle 
First National Bank case was not ambiguous because the 
language referred specifically to cost of living figures "for 
the City of Spokane". In the present case, there is an 
ambiquity as to whether the parties were referring to an index 
specifically entitled "United States Cost of Living Index" or 
simply to an index covering the United States as a whole. 
In Johnston v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 
supra., cited by Wood, the court noted that there was no 
evidence in the record to show what the parties actually 
intended, or to furnish some basis for determining by 
implication or construction what the parties would be deemed 
to have intended as reasonable persons acting in good faith. 
Thus, the court held it could not determine which index was to 
be utilized. In the present case, such evidence was 
presented. Wood, himself, testified that he assumed an index 
would be utilized which comports precisely with the index 
actually utilized. Further, as previously noted, the Court in 
Johnston held that the plaintiff who had actually paid the 
increased rent was bound by the index utilized by the landlord. 
In executing the Lease, Wood agreed and intended to pay 
increases in rent in accordance with increases in the cost of 
living in the United States as a whole. The trial court 
simply held Wood to that bargain. 
D. THE BARNES CHILDREN WERE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD FOR 
INCREASES IN PROPERTY TAXES. 
Wood, in an overly technical and unwarranted reading of 
the Lease, argues that the trial court erred in awarding the 
Barnes Children increases in property taxes paid on the basis 
that the Lease provides that those increased taxes would be 
due from Wood "upon proof of payment of the same11 and that 
prior to trial the Barnes Children did not tender any proof of 
payment to Wood. This argument is frivolous. 
First, Wood never refused to pay the taxes on the basis 
that he had not been provided with proof of payment. In fact, 
Wood never even requested proof that the taxes had been paid. 
[R. 619] Rather, Wood always refused to pay the taxes on the 
basis of his claim that he was only obligated to pay $1,000 
fixed rent for the rest of the term. Having never objected to 
payment of the increased taxes on the basis that proof of 
payment had not been given, Wood cannot now complain. 
Further, the Barnes Children undeniably proved at trial that 
the taxes had been paid. [R. 348-352; Ex. 6] Conseqently, any 
requirement of proof has been satisfied. 
Second, Wood's argument is premised on the contention 
that proof of payment of the taxes was a condition precedent 
to the obligation to pay. However, courts do not favor 
conditions and wherever possible will construe a provision of 
a contract as a covenant rather than as a condition. For 
example, in Hohenberg Bros, Co, v, George E. Gibbons & Co,, 
537 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1976), the Court observed: 
"However, where the intent of the parties is 
doubtful or where a condition would impose an 
absurd or impossible result then the agreement will 
be interpreted as creating a covenant rather than a 
condition, [citations omitted] This Court has on 
numerous occasions discussed the nature of 
conditions and covenants and as a general rule has 
noted that, 'because of their harshness in 
operation, conditions are not favorites of the 
law.'" 
Treating the language of the present Lease as a covenant that 
the Barnes Children would prove to Wood that the Barnes 
Children had paid the taxes, Wood is clearly liable for the 
payment of the increased taxes because the alleged failure to 
present such proof prior to trial caused Wood no damage. 
E. THE PARTNERSHIP IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS1 
FEES INCURRED BELOW AND UPON APPEAL. 
1. The Award of Attorneys1 Fees Below Was Proper. 
Contrary to Wood's argument, there was in fact 
evidence to support the trial court's apportionment of the 
fees incurred by the Barnes Children in connection with the 
unsuccessful fraud claim and the claims upon which they were 
successful. 
The parties stipulated below that attorneys' fees 
could be proven up by the prevailing party by affidavit after 
the decision of the Court was rendered. In accordance with 
that stipulation, counsel submitted an affidavit to the Court 
specifying the nature of the services performed for, and the 
amount of attorneys1 fees incurred by, the Barnes Children in 
connection with the case. Wood objected to the affidavit on 
the basis that there was no apportionment of the services 
performed in connection with the fraud claim. Counsel then 
filed an supplemental affidavit which stated that virtually no 
additional time, effort or expense was incurred in presenting 
the fraud claim because the same witnesses, documents, 
testimony and argument would have been presented with or 
without the fraud claim. [R. 277-279] 
One of the contentions made by Wood in this action 
was that as of 1980 when the modification agreement was made, 
Wood was entitled to an equitable adjustment of the rent based 
upon the supposed fact that Wood was allegedly losing several 
thousand dollars a year at the Palace store. The fraud claim 
was based upon the fact that in reality Wood was not losing 
any money on the store, and that Wood had only created an 
artificial loss of a couple of thousand dollars by marking up 
the price of the ice cream which Wood sold to himself and by 
charging the Palace store with an arbitrary share of the 
overhead expenses of Wood's general operation. The same 
evidence which was presented to show that the Palace store had 
not in fact lost money was relevant and would have been 
introduced to show not only that Wood had committed fraud, but 
also to show that no possible equitable claim existed for 
adjustment of rent. 
Thus, there was in fact evidence presented by the 
Barnes Children from which the trial court reasonably 
determined its award of attorneys' fees. The trial court, in 
its discretion, did not accept, in total, the evidence 
presented by the Barnes Children that no additional time, 
expense or effort was involved with respect to the fraud claim 
and determined based upon the evidence that one-third of the 
time spent by counsel reasonably related to the fraud claim 
for which attorneys' fees could not be recovered. The trial 
court, therefore, reduced the amount of attorneys' fees by 
one-third and entered Judgment for attorneys' fees in the sum 
of $6,566.66. 
It is well settled that a trial court has a great 
deal of discretion in determining the amount of attorneys' 
fees and that in the absence of an abuse of that discretion, 
the amount of the attorneys' fees will not be disturbed. 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 
671 (Utah 1982). The question of what is a reasonable 
attorney's fee depends on a number of factors which the trial 
court is in an advantaged position to determine. Wallis v. 
Build, Inc., 402 P.2d 699 (Utah 1965). In making that 
determination a trial court may take into consideration not 
only what the attorney has billed and the number of hours 
spent but the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of 
the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of 
the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services, the amount 
involved in the case and the result attained, and the 
expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. Cabrera 
v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985). The fact that the 
trial court did not accept all of the evidence presented on 
attorneys1 fees is not important. The trial court was not 
simply limited to accepting or rejecting all of the evidence 
on attorneys1 fees, but was entitled to make its own 
assessment of the additional fees necessitated by the fraud 
claim. 
The cases cited by Wood in his attempt to overturn 
the award of attorneys1 fees are distinguishable from the case 
at bar. 
In Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978) 
(Wood's Brief p. 51), the Plaintiff had presented absolutely 
no evidence as to the amount of fees incurred with respect to 
collection of a note as opposed to the fees incurred on a 
claim for which fees could not be awarded. Rather, counsel 
testified that he had "no idea" how much time had been spent 
in collecting the note. Further, the trial court did not even 
attempt to apportion the fees incurred in connection with 
collection of the note, but awarded fees based upon the offer 
of judgment provisions of Rule 68(b), U.R.C.P. This Court 
simply determined that it was error for the trial court to 
award fees under Rule 68(b) and that because there had been no 
evidence presented as to the amount of fees incurred in 
collection of the notes, attorneys1 fees had been improperly 
awarded. In contrast, in the present case, counsel did in 
fact testify concerning the amount of additional time spent in 
connection with prosecution of the fraud claim. The trial 
court simply refused to adopt the Barnes Children's contention 
and apportioned the fees based upon its own review of the 
evidence. 
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc, 
657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982), cited by Wood, the trial court had 
apportioned the attorneys' fees but had done so based solely 
on a post-trial statement of counsel rather than upon the 
evidence presented on the issue. This Court simply held that 
the trial court's decision had to be based upon the evidence 
and remanded the matter for the limited purpose of determining 
either from the evidence already presented or from additional 
evidence what a reasonable and equitable apportionment of the 
fees should be. 
In short, the evidence was sufficient to support 
the trial court's award of attorneys' fees. Further, even if 
the evidence was not sufficient, attorneys' fees should not be 
denied but the matter should simply be remanded for the 
purpose of determining a proper apportionment of the fees. 
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc, supra. 
2. The Barnes Children Are Entitled to Recover 
Fees Incurred on Appeal. 
If the Barnes Children prevail on this Appeal, they 
are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees incurred on Appeal 
and the case should be remanded for the purpose of determining 
the additional amount of attorneys1 fees to be awarded. 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates/ 617 P.2d 
406 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
Wood clearly agreed in the Lease to pay rent 
escalations based upon increases in the cost of living and to 
pay a percentage of any increases in taxes and the parking lot 
lease. All the trial court did was to reject Wood's repeated 
attempts to avoid these obligations and to hold Wood to his 
bargain. Wood's Brief, for the most part, simply seeks to 
overturn the Judgment by focusing on what he considers to be 
favorable evidence and ignoring the substantial evidence 
supporting the Judgment. Such an attack is unavailing. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Judgment should 
be affirmed and that the Barnes Children should be awarded 
their attorneys' fees and costs incurred on this Appeal. 
DATED this 2G?— day of July, 1985. 
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